Elsewhere, I have very briefly surveyed the data on the harms done by lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic.
But how did lockdowns come about in the first place?
Prior to 2020, scientists knew for decades that highly restrictive pandemic measures were a mistake. As one of the most influential papers on this topic published by experts at Johns Hopkins University in 2006 warned:
“Experience has shown that communities faced with epidemics or other adverse events respond best and with the least anxiety when the normal social functioning of the community is least disrupted. Strong political and public health leadership to provide reassurance and to ensure that needed medical care services are provided are critical elements. If either is seen to be less than optimal, a manageable epidemic could move toward catastrophe.”
It is shocking indeed just how much lockdowns flew in the face of scientific consensus, and just how much several decades of the scientific literature, all the way through early 2020, were opposed to them.
As Greg Ip wrote in the Wall Street Journal:
“Prior to Covid-19, lockdowns weren’t part of the standard epidemic tool kit, which was primarily designed with flu in mind. During the 1918–1919 flu pandemic, some American cities closed schools, churches and theaters, banned large gatherings and funerals and restricted store hours. But none imposed stay-at-home orders or closed all nonessential businesses. No such measures were imposed during the 1957 flu pandemic, the next-deadliest one; even schools stayed open.”
As a very prominent team of scientists at Johns Hopkins School of Public Health wrote in 2006:
“As experience shows, there is no basis for recommending quarantine either of groups or individuals. The problems in implementing such measures are formidable, and secondary effects of absenteeism and community disruption as well as possible adverse consequences, such as loss of public trust in government and stigmatization of quarantined people and groups, are likely to be considerable.”
As a report from the World Health Organization report put it in 2006:
“Reports from the 1918 influenza pandemic indicate that social-distancing measures did not stop or appear to dramatically reduce transmission.”
As John Barry, who wrote the authoritative account of the 1918 influenza pandemic, wrote in 2009:
“Historical data clearly demonstrate that quarantine does not work unless it is absolutely rigid and complete.”
Discussing the failure of military experiments using lockdowns in military bases to prevent respiratory viral outbreaks, Barry added:
“If a military camp cannot be successfully quarantined in wartime, it is highly unlikely a civilian community can be quarantined during peacetime.”
In 2019, as a report for the World Health Organization would state:
“Home quarantine of exposed individuals to reduce transmission is not recommended because there is no obvious rationale for this measure, and there would be considerable difficulties in implementing it.”
That same year, a report by a team in Johns Hopkins would say:
“In the context of a high-impact respiratory pathogen, quarantine may be the least likely NPI to be effective in controlling the spread due to high transmissibility.”
As Anthony Fauci said about lockdowns in January 2020:
“Historically when you shut things down it doesn’t have a major effect.”
On March 2, 2020, more than 800 public health elites signed an open letter to Vice President Mike Pence encouraging him to take a moderate approach to the pandemic, consistent with the decades of scientific consensus in public health. Signatories of the Pence Letter included noted Yale Professor of Public Health Gregg Gonsalves, professor and science communicator Esther Choo, Harvard Professor Marc Lipsitch, Dean of Emory School of Medicine Carlos Del Rios, Harvard School of Public Health Professor Julia Marcus, future vaccine mandate lawyer and Professor of UC Hastings School of Law Dorit Reiss, future Dean of the Yale School of Public Health Megan Ranney, and future CDC Director Rochelle Walensky.
In the Pence Letter, they wrote:
"Mandatory quarantine, regional lockdowns, and travel bans have been used to address the risk of COVID-19 in the US and abroad. But they are difficult to implement, can undermine public trust, have large societal costs and, importantly, disproportionately affect the most vulnerable segments in our communities."
Authors also exhorted policymakers to: not make “misleading or unfounded statements”; not suppress or manipulate information; not “scapegoat and discriminate against individuals or groups”; “refrain from providing false reassurances”; and “allow people to voluntarily cooperate with public health advice”. Authors also made clear that: “Mandatory quarantine, regional lockdowns, and travel bans… are difficult to implement, can undermine public trust, have large societal costs and, importantly, disproportionately affect the most vulnerable segments in our communities,” and that “voluntary self-isolation measures are more likely to induce cooperation and protect public trust than coercive measures.”
Yet, just one week later, the public health community reversed its positions. One by one, countries began to implement mandatory quarantine, travel bans, and draconian national lockdowns, intentionally mislead the public, promote interventions that were not supported by science, and adopt a politicized, quasi-militarized, authoritarian approach to managing the pandemic. Those who still advocated for the principles contained in the Pence Letter were accused of misinformation and confronted with severe social and professional penalties, while many who signed the Pence Letter fell into line and promoted the pandemic policy du jour.
Why did this occur? This is something that must be understood in parts.